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Abstract—This work presents an application of the highly 
expressive Attribute-Based Encryption to implement wireless-
delimited Secure Zones for firearms. Within these zones, radio-
transmitted local policies based on attributes of the consumer and 
the firearm are received by embedded hardware in the firearms, 
which then advises the consumer about safe operations. The 
Secure Zones utilize Attribute-Based Encryption to encode the 
policies and consumer or user attributes, and providing privacy 
and security through it cryptography. We describe a holistic 
approach to evolving the firearm to a cyber-physical system to aid 
in augmenting safety. We introduce a conceptual model for a 
firearm equipped with sensors and a context-aware software 
agent. Based on the information from the sensors, the agent can 
access the context and inform the consumer of potential unsafe 
operations. To support Secure Zones and the cyber-physical 
firearm model, we propose a Key Infrastructure Scheme for key 
generation, distribution, and management, and a Context-Aware 
Software Agent Framework for Firearms. 
Index Terms—cyber-physical system; attribute-based 
encryption; context-awareness; safety; software agent; wireless 
communication; firearm 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Advances of digital technologies, as they are incorporated 
into devices for people’s usage, often result in enhancements 
including ease of use, safety, precision, optimizations in 
resource consumption and costs. In particular, these 
technological advances spawned a class of systems named 
Cyber-Physical Systems, in which computational elements 
integrate with physical objects, capable of evolving a purely 
mechanical device into a cyber-aided version. 
The trend has touched several areas, producing machines 
heavily dependent on cyber systems; onto these machines we 
rely, and to which we happily entrust our lives. Commercial 
aircraft possess a multitude of onboard systems to aid operation, 
from fly-by-wire components, to autopilots that follow 
navigation maps and can automate landing procedures. Military 
aircraft, such as the B-2 Stealth Bomber, have exceptionally 
complex avionics, without which the aircraft would be unstable 
to fly [1]. Automobiles usually integrate anti-lock brakes, safety 
airbags, and may be available with traction control and collision 
avoidance systems. During 1991 and 1993 seasons, the Formula 
One (F1) team Williams presented a car equipped with active 
suspension. The suspension, together with telemetry, was 
capable of detecting terrain configuration and self-adjusting for 
optimal aerodynamics and equilibrium of the car. The system 
gave rise to a car so vastly superior to its counterparts and so fast 
that further F1 regulations banned similar technological driver-
aids [2]. Google is forwarding research in self-driven cars and 
expects them to be available in less than a decade [3]. 
Furthermore, patients surrender their health to pacemakers 
and electronic monitors. There are robotic instruments capable 
of performing surgery [4] (although the delicate and expensive 
nature of its market has recently given raise to scrutiny [5]), and 
ongoing research on human exoskeletons [6]. More and more, 
we integrate machinery with cyber-capabilities into our daily 
activities and experiment enhanced safety, comfort, and 
productivity. 
One device has persisted largely untouched by cyber 
technology since its inception possibly in the 12th century: the 
firearm. In light of recent tragic mass shootings, communities 
again claim for employing technology to boost firearm safety 
[7], [8]. In this paper, we propose evolving this mechanical 
device into a cyber-physical system for greater consumer safety. 
In our scheme, we also combine the broadcast nature of wireless 
communication and the expressiveness of a one-to-many 
cryptosystem, Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), to establish 
wireless-delimited zones within which, according to choice, a 
firearm can alert the consumer, or user, of unsafe operation, 
depending on attributes programmed in the gun’s electronics. 
Furthermore, we discuss incorporating a range of common 
sensors to the firearms and enable context-aware decision 
capabilities; by analyzing the several inputs from the embedded 
sensors and evaluating context, a firearm could alert the 
consumer of unsafe operations by utilizing haptic and visual 
feedbacks. 
Understandably, adding electronics to a firearm can be 
interpreted as adding layers of failure to a reasonably reliable 
piece of machinery [9]. However, as we articulated earlier, we 
already depend, for our safety, on engines with high degree of 
integration of electronics, such as aircraft and automobiles: these 
engines became safer and more reliable with the aid of 
technology. It is reasonable to expect that technology can help 
enhance a firearm safe operation. 
In the next section, we survey related work in gun safety. In 
Section III, we present our view of the firearm as a cyber-
physical system featuring sensors and a context-aware software 
agent, and in Section IV, the supporting Context-Aware Agent 
Framework. We describe the fundamentals of Attribute-Based 
Encryption in Section V. Section VI depicts our Secure Zones 
and its operation. The proposed Key Infrastructure Scheme for 
generation, distribution and management of encryption keys is 
discussed in VII. We conclude the paper with future work in 
Section VIII. 
In this document, we use the definitions “consumer” and 
“user” interchangeably. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Integrating cyber technology in weapons, either for the 
purpose of increased safety or increased lethal capacity, has been 
proposed for many years. In particular, personal weapons which 
would integrate cyber systems have been known as “smart guns” 
[9]. 
Solutions that involve detecting an authorized consumer by 
means of a wearable radio transmitter include iGUN [10], in 
which the consumer wears a special ring that likely possesses an 
RFID transmitter. When the ring is in close proximity with the 
trigger, an actuator unlocks the weapon. A manual safety lock is 
still available, adding a second layer of security. TriggerSmart 
[11] employs a similar mechanism, however without the second, 
manual safety lock, as inferred from the available prototypes 
displayed in videos at the time of this writing. TriggerSmart 
proponents also mention “safe zones” within which guns would 
be remotely disabled. The guns would contain hardware based 
on an RF transceiver and would employ DASH7 wireless sensor 
protocol [12]. 
Armatix [13] utilizes an RFID wristwatch that, in addition, 
allows entering a PIN to unlock the firearm in its radio range and 
may use specific times for gun deactivation. A Target Response 
System would also deactivate the weapon if it were not on target. 
No details are furnished, however, on how this system operates 
and which sensors it involves. 
The New Jersey Institute of Technology presented a 
prototype of firearm in which an array of transducers (more 
specifically, pressure sensors) distributed over the handle 
detects the allegedly unique way a consumer grips a firearm 
[14], [15]. Using this biometrics data, the weapon may recognize 
authorized users and activate the locking mechanism 
appropriately. 
In our holistic approach, we augment these views by 
building a context-aware system in the firearm, assessing the 
environment from an array of sensors and constructing safety 
decisions. Furthermore, our model may offer different operation 
choices, from an off setting, to an advisory mode, to a fully 
locking mode, such that our solutions can be validated in short 
term. 
III. THE FIREARM AS CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
With current technology, a firearm could comprise a set of 
sensors enabling it to gather a wide range of information from 
the environment. A software agent inside the firearm can 
integrate the contextual information to form an evaluation of the 
immediate situation; the firearm becomes context-aware. Upon 
this evaluation, the firearm can advise the consumer of potential 
unsafe operations through visual or haptic feedback, or actuate 
a locking mechanism. 
However, before firearms can lock themselves, society and 
policy/law must agree on this path. Moreover, to guarantee that 
guns without self-enforcement do not have an unfair advantage 
upon those guns that are able to self-lock, both these types of 
guns (ideally) cannot coexist. To overcome this difficulty in the 
short term, our firearm model has three modes of operation 
(selectable by software or by a PIN panel): Off, in which all 
cyber-systems are deactivated, and the firearm functions as a 
pure mechanical device; Advisory Mode, in which the Secure 
Zone and context agent act as an advisory system for safe 
operations, indicating unsafe situations by means of visual and 
haptic feedback; and Full Lock, in which, in addition to 
feedback, the actuator can operate the locking mechanism to 
prevent the gun from firing. Fig. 1 portrays this cyber-physical, 
context-aware firearm concept. This conceptual model presents 
the sensors, feedback outputs and their corresponding intents as 
listed in Table I. 
TABLE I: SENSORS AND FEEDBACK IN CONCEPTUAL FIREARM MODEL. 
Sensor Operation 
Microphone to detect environment audio and assess 
potential anomalous situations, such as 
abundance of noise, screams (panic?), or 
shouted commands. 
Front-facing 
camera 
to assist in detecting invalid targets (see 
[16] for examples of using cameras to 
identify gestures). 
Rear-facing 
camera 
can be used to identify the owner. 
Pressure sensors 
in handle 
used to recognize the particular grip of a 
consumer, or anomalous grips [15]. 
Accelerometers may detect excessive shaking 
(incompatible with proper weapon 
handling), among other functions. 
Actuator-
operated safety 
lock 
if the context agent infers an anomalous 
behavior, or the firearm is not advised to 
operate according to the Secure Zone 
policy, an actuator locks the firearm in the 
Full Lock mode. 
Haptic feedback if the context agent infers an anomalous 
behavior or dangerous handling, the 
firearm handle can slightly vibrate or 
change texture, alerting the consumer of 
unsafe operation. 
Context Color-
coded visual 
feedback 
in case of dangerous handling, as inferred 
by the context agent, a light comes on 
close to the user’s eye of sight, alerting of 
unsafe operation. 
TPD (Tamper-
Proof Device) 
hardware with tamper-resisting 
capabilities. Such device is secure, cannot 
be compromised and no data can be from 
it by adversaries [17], [18]. 
Cyber-physical 
software agent 
Software component of our cyber-
physical firearm model, stored into the 
TPD. Analyzes inputs from sensors to 
infer context, and performs cryptography 
operations. The agent is build according 
to our Context-Aware Agent Framework, 
which we present in Section IV. 
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Initially, we develop the necessary components for 
implementing the Secure Zones, described in Section VI. Those 
would involve radio antennas for wireless communications, the 
TPD with cryptography and context software agent, and 
feedback mechanisms. 
IV. CONTEXT-AWARE AGENT FRAMEWORK 
We propose a framework for context-aware mobile 
applications, based on software agents (Fig. 2), applied to 
support the firearm cyber-physical model. These agents, 
implemented on firearms, act on behalf of the consumer/device. 
The agents interact with the environment and network through 
sensors, and with other agents and applicable software. From 
data acquired through the array of sensors, consumer input, and 
(possibly) other agents, the agent can build a context and analyze 
it using a range of artificial intelligence and statistical tools. 
Then, the agent can make decisions according to its goals, plans, 
and current state [19]. For brevity and space constraints, we do 
not develop a full description of this framework in this 
document. 
V. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION 
In their pivotal paper, Sahai and Waters [20] introduced a 
new concept for encryption, in which the sharing or access rules 
are expressed in the encryption algorithm itself. Essentially, the 
data owner provides a predicate or function 𝑓𝑓 describing how 
the data is to be accessed. Each user 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (where 𝑖𝑖 is an integer that 
indicates a specific user) possesses a set of credentials 𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 out 
of a set of credentials 𝒜𝒜. Then, the user with credentials 𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is 
able to decrypt a ciphertext with an expressed function 𝑓𝑓  if 
𝑓𝑓�𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� = 1. In [20], the authors depicted a specific instance of 
this problem, hence called Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). 
In ABE, a set of “attributes” represents a user’s set of 
credentials, and a formula with these attributes as input 
represents the function. Essentially, the formula acts as an access 
policy. 
This work was further expanded by [21], in which ABE was 
formulated in two complementary forms, Key-Policy ABE (KP-
ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In the former, the 
ciphertexts are generated by including the desired complete set 
of attributes; the formulas over these attributes, or the access 
policies, are expressed in the users’ secret keys. The latter 
prescribes that the attributes pertaining to a user are expressed 
in that user’s secret key, whereas the formula or access policy is 
attached to the ciphertext at the moment of encryption [22]. 
Attribute-based Encryption has motivated numerous 
applications [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28],[29]. In this work, 
we propose to use CP-ABE for safe firearms operations. 
VI. THE SECURE ZONE 
The idea of areas in which guns are unsafe to be operated is 
certainly not new, and forms of it are in fact already in effect. 
Guns are generally not allowed beyond security checkpoints in 
airports, onboard airplanes, in most consulates and embassies, 
etc. These zones must be imposed by regulation and 
enforcement. We propose to address these safety areas within 
the firearm itself, with the aid of digital technologies. 
One naïve approach to realizing safety areas would be to 
have the firearm communicate with a transmitter within the 
safety area and negotiate its operations. This operation would 
require two-way radio communications, which is still costly for 
devices that depend on battery, as it would be the case for the 
firearm in this example. Moreover, the two-way 
communications must employ secure and reliable protocols that 
might result in increased complexity and overhead. 
The proper identification of the firearm or consumer poses 
another challenge. If a gun or consumer is to be uniquely 
identified to establish the authorization to operate the firearm, 
then a gun must transmit this identification to the area controller, 
which would then verify the authorization against a database of 
identifications. The area controller would then inform its 
authorization decision to the firearm. Although feasible, this 
protocol might incur scalability issues. Moreover, it would 
require two-way communications between the gun and the area 
controller, entailing a transmitter in the gun with sufficient 
power, and this would raise the energy (i.e., battery)  
Fig. 1: Firearm model. 
 
Fig. 2: Context-aware Agent Framework. 
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requirements for the gun electronic hardware. We visualize a 
simpler, safer schema, which we depict in Fig. 3. 
In this schema, a Secure Zone comprises one or more radio 
transmitters that will transmit a digital message containing the 
zone authorization for operation policy for firearms. The 
message consists of an encrypted digital signature together with 
the codification of a firearm operation policy for the zone, using 
CP-ABE. A known signature from a trusted authority and a 
private component, which is only known by the trusted 
authority, compose the encrypted digital signature. Each Secure 
Zone will have its own wireless transmission with its own 
encrypted message representing the firearm operation policy 
within that zone. 
Individual firearms receive, at the time of purchase or during 
a registration process, a private key that encodes attributes of 
that firearm and those of the authorized consumer. For instance, 
a hunter would have attributes such as 
“OPEN_HUNTING_AREA, SHOOTING_RANGE”. A 
security guard located at a court of justice would have attributes 
“COURT_JUSTICE, SHOOTING_RANGE”. A civilian 
without special clearance could possess attribute 
“SHOOTING_RANGE” only, and a law-enforcement agent 
with high security clearance would retain a set of many 
attributes, or one attribute such as “LAW_ENFORCEMENT”. 
(We propose and describe an infrastructure for key management 
and distribution tailored for our Secure Zones in Section VII.) 
A firearm within a Secure Zone range receives the zone 
wireless broadcast transmission through its radio interface. The 
embedded software agent attempts to decode the encrypted 
message using the firearm’s integrated private key, which 
contains the codified attributes of the firearm and its owner. If 
the agent successfully decrypts the message, it means that 
firearm is able to operate within that zone; otherwise, the 
operation is not safe, and the firearm’s feedback components 
will actuate to inform the consumer of such. The haptic feedback 
component may vibrate, and the visual feedback component will 
illuminate to alert the consumer. 
VII. KEY INFRASTRUCTURE SCHEME 
Our Secure Zone scheme uses CP-ABE, and encompasses 
message encryption, key generation, and key distribution. In this 
section, we compose an infrastructure to support our scheme, 
which deals with the specifics of our firearm conceptual design 
and Secure Zone scheme. This infrastructure builds upon 
systems proposed by [29], [30], [31]. In the following 
descriptions, we do not mention some components: further 
details can be found in the respective references. 
A. System Model 
In our model, there are Secure Zone Authorities, a Central 
Authority, and consumers/firearms, depicted in Fig. 4. Each is 
described next. 
1) Central Authority (CA) 
The CA is managed by the government (the same branch that 
regulates firearms), and it is trusted. The CA’s responsibility is 
to issue keys to firearms, manage the attribute set 𝒜𝒜 , and 
register Secure Zone Authorities, sending them cryptography 
parameters. 
2) Secure Zone Authority (SZA) 
The SZA is responsible for encrypting and wirelessly 
transmitting Secure Zone messages to the consumers/firearms. 
An SZA is managed by a zone administrator or owner, i.e., an 
SZA comprising a certain shopping mall is managed by that 
shopping mall’s administration. SZA’s must register with the 
CA to receive proper cryptography parameters. 
3) Firearms (F) 
A firearm receives its ABE secret key and other security 
parameters upon registration with the proper government 
branch. This secret key expresses the attributes established by 
the government, according to specific rules that consider the 
firearm and the consumer/owner. 
B. System Algorithms 
A summary of the system algorithms follows. 
Setup: randomized algorithm run by the CA and SZA. CA: 
takes the security parameter as input; outputs an ABE system 
public key and an ABE system master secret key; also generates 
a public/private key pair for CA usage. SZA: generates a 
public/private key pair for SZA usage. 
 
Fig. 3: Secure Zones. 
 
Fig. 4: System model. 
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Attribute key generation: randomized algorithm run by the 
CA. Input: CA’s system master secret and public keys, a 
firearm’s unique ID, a user’s unique ID, a random number x, an 
expiration time ℯ𝓉𝓉 , and a set of attributes 𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 possessed by the 
user/firearm 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. Outputs user (ABE) secret key for the firearm. 
Token authenticator: a function that generates a number 
𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 (the token) according to a seed and a message. The seed is a 
unique (random) secret, and the message is a certain number of 
periods elapsed since a given timestamp (such as the Unix 
epoch) [32], [33]. The idea is that if two parties have the same 
algorithm and the same seed (and synchronized clocks), legally 
obtained from a trusted source, both parties can generate the 
same number and thus one party can verify the authenticity of 
the other just by asking for the current generated number. 
Encryption: randomized algorithm run by an SZA. Inputs: 
the Secure Zone policy for the SZA (i.e., the function 𝑓𝑓  as 
explained in Section V), a message m, a token 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉, the SZA 
public key encrypted with the CA private key, a timestamp 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉, 
and the ABE system public key. Outputs the encrypted 
ciphertext. 
Decryption: deterministic algorithm run by the firearm 
software agent. Takes as input a ciphertext and a decryption key 
(the firearm/user ABE secret key), generated for an attribute set 
𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. Outputs the decrypted ciphertext if 𝑓𝑓�𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� = 1. 
C. Scheme Construction and Operation 
We describe how our infrastructure operates; some steps are 
not referenced and others, simplified. 
1) System Setup 
Central Authority: generates its ABE system public/master 
secret key. Generates its own public/private key. Securely stores 
each SZA’s public key and securely sends this SZA public key 
back to the SZA, encrypted with the CA private key, generating 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ), where i is the particular SZA (the purpose of 
this will be explained later). Also sends along the system public 
key and the token authenticator algorithm and its system seed. 
Safe Zone Authority: SZA registers with CA, receives a set 
of attributes 𝒜𝒜 . Generates its public/private keys. Securely 
sends its public key to CA, receives the system public key and 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ) from the CA. 
2) Consumer Registration and Secret Key Generation 
Upon registration and consumer, or user, authentication with 
the government branch, a set of attributes 𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢  will be 
determined for the user u. The CA will generate the firearm/user 
ABE secret key expressing the user attributes (bonded by a 
random number x to prevent colluding) together with the firearm 
ID, user ID, x and expiration time ℯ𝓉𝓉. This key is recorded into 
the firearm’s TPD, along with the token authenticator algorithm, 
its system seed, and the CA’s public key. 
3) Secure Zone Authority Encrypted Transmission 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 decides on a Secure Zone policy 𝑓𝑓 over the attribute 
set 𝒜𝒜. Generates token 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 and hashes it using standard hashing 
algorithm; obtains ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉) . Encrypts ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)  with the 
SZA private key, generating 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) . Uses the 
token 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉  as symmetric key to encrypt 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) 
together with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ), and a timestamp 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉. Uses the 
ABE system public key to encrypt previous result, 
𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 �,𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉) , per the policy 
𝑓𝑓 ; the final result is the message 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . This message is 
broadcast via radio following a proper wireless communications 
standard. 
4) Decryption, Secure Operation Assessment 
A firearm 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 within the range of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 Secure Zone receives, 
via its antenna, the message 𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. The software agent applies 
the decryption secret key. If the firearm has the appropriate 
attribute set 𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 such that 𝑓𝑓�𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� = 1, then the decryption is 
successful, and the agent obtains 
𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 �,𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉). Agent runs its 
own token authenticator algorithm (with the same seed as the 
SZA, recorded at registration), obtains 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑢𝑢. Agent uses 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑢𝑢 as 
symmetric key to decrypt last outcome and get 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 , 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ) . If 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑢𝑢 ≠ 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 , 
decrypt will fail; stop and alert user. Else, if ℯ𝓉𝓉 < 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉 (secret key 
expired), then stop and alert user. Else, use the CA public key 
stored with the agent to decrypt 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ) . Use the 
resulting 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  to decrypt 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)) ; if final 
product is different than ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑢𝑢) (apply the same standard 
hashing algorithm to 𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉𝑢𝑢, compare to ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ(𝓉𝓉𝓉𝓉)), then at least 
one of the previous keys is invalid, or the message is invalid. 
Stop and alert user. Else, firearm is safe to operate within this 
Secure Zone. If, in the first step, 𝑓𝑓�𝒜𝒜𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� ≠ 1, then decryption 
is unsuccessful, resulting in a message of invalid format. Stop 
and alert user. 
By using a token authenticator, the software agent is able to 
detect problems with the transmission or a potential replay 
attack. If an attacker records a transmission and later replays it, 
there will be a token mismatch, as the token authenticator 
algorithm will generate different numbers based on the current 
time. Therefore, the hash of the token and the symmetric key 
(the token itself) will change periodically. Notice that the actual 
token is never transmitted; both parties (firearm and SZA) can 
generate similar tokens given the same secret seed, algorithm 
and current time. 
Likewise, the simple timestamp and expiration time protocol 
allows the agent to verify the validity of the secret key. The 
agent can be programmed to enforce a key update as soon as an 
expiration event happens. 
5) Revocation and Expiration 
In this key infrastructure scheme, the key revocation happens 
when they expire. On this event, CA must generate a new 
consumer secret key, as described before. 
6) Key Update 
If a consumer wants to claim more attributes in addition to 
his/her current ones, follow the same procedure for consumer 
secret key generation, when CA will generate a new secret key. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We proposed Secure Zones, wireless-delimited areas within 
which encrypted messages using the Ciphertext-Policy 
Attribute-Based Encryption and expressing a zone’s security 
policy are transmitted to our model application, firearms, within 
range. This cryptography maintains both privacy and security of 
communications, and its expressiveness means only firearms 
possessing the necessary attributes are able to decrypt those 
messages (through their agents). Thus, these firearms/agents can 
evaluate whether the firearm may operate within the zone. To 
support Secure Zones, we propose a Key Infrastructure for key 
generation, management, and distribution. The scheme uses a 
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Central Authority for key generation, Secure Zone Authorities 
for encrypted message transmission, and timestamps and token 
authenticator algorithm for verifying authenticity and validity. 
Furthermore, we presented our view of the firearm as a 
cyber-physical system. In our model, digital technologies 
enhance a firearm’s safety through several components. In one 
component, we designed a conceptual model of a firearm fitted 
with an array of sensors and a context-aware software agent. The 
software agent uses the sensors and its agent programming to 
evaluate context and advise the consumer of potential unsafe 
operations. We introduced a Context-Aware Agent Framework, 
upon which those agents are built. Our initial experimentation 
focuses on implementing the key infrastructure and performing 
simulations, in which we evaluate and demonstrate whether 
mobile users within secure zones range can properly receive and 
decrypt the messages, if they have the appropriate attributes. 
Our future work involves investigating the effectiveness of 
the proposed security model, and how to best address the issues 
of key revocation and update, as well as its performance in light 
of several attack vectors. Moreover, we will augment our model 
with delegating key generation to the Secure Zone Authorities, 
and prototype components of the system. We will scrutinize a 
suitable wireless communication infrastructure for the Secure 
Zones, such as [34] and [35] 
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